Thresholds of income inequality that mitigate the role of gender inclusive education in promoting gender economic inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa by Asongu, Simplice & Odhiambo, Nicholas
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Thresholds of income inequality that
mitigate the role of gender inclusive
education in promoting gender economic
inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa
Asongu, Simplice and Odhiambo, Nicholas
January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102033/
MPRA Paper No. 102033, posted 24 Jul 2020 14:05 UTC
1 
 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/19/087 
 
 
 
Thresholds of income inequality that mitigate the role of gender inclusive 
education in promoting gender economic inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 
 
 
 
Forthcoming: Social Responsibility Journal 
 
 
Simplice  A. Asongu  
Department of Economics, University of South Africa. 
P. O. Box 392, UNISA 0003, Pretoria South Africa. 
E-mails: asongusimplice@yahoo.com , 
asongus@afridev.org  
 
Nicholas M. Odhiambo 
Department of Economics, University of South Africa. 
P. O. Box 392, UNISA 0003, Pretoria South Africa. 
E-mails: odhianm@unisa.ac.za , 
                 nmbaya99@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This working paper also appears in the Development Bank of Nigeria Working Paper Series. 
2 
 
2019   African Governance and Development Institute                                        WP/19/087 
   
Research Department 
 
Thresholds of income inequality that mitigate the role of gender inclusive education in 
promoting gender economic inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
   
Simplice A. Asongu & Nicholas M. Odhiambo 
 
January 2019 
 
Abstract 
 
This study provides thresholds of inequality that should not be exceeded if gender inclusive 
education is to enhance gender inclusive formal economic participation in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments and data 
from 42 countries during the period 2004-2014. The following findings are established.  First, 
inclusive tertiary education unconditionally promotes gender economic inclusion while the 
interaction between tertiary education and inequality is unfavourable to gender economic 
inclusion. Second, a Gini coefficient that nullifies the positive incidence of inclusive tertiary 
education on female labour force participation is 0.562. Second, the Gini coefficient and the 
Palma ratio that crowd-out the negative unconditional effects of inclusive tertiary education 
on female unemployment are 0.547 and 6.118, respectively. Third, a 0.578 Gini coefficient, a 
0.680 Atkinson index and a 6.557 Palma ratio are critical masses that wipe-out the positive 
unconditional effects of inclusive tertiary education on female employment. Findings 
associated with lower levels of education are not significant. As the main policy implication, 
income inequality should not be tolerated above the established thresholds in order for gender 
inclusive education to promote gender inclusive formal economic participation.  Other 
implications are discussed in the light of Sustainable Development Goals.  This research 
complements the existing literature by providing inequality thresholds that should not be 
exceeded in order for gender inclusive education to promote the involvement of women in the 
formal economic sector.   
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1. Introduction 
Inclusive policies for education that are designed to involve more girls in education and 
training are obviously designed to improve the participation of the female gender in economic 
development through inter alia: employment in the formal economic sector. An important 
policy syndrome that can limit the effectiveness of gender inclusive education policies in 
translating into gender economic participation is income inequality in society2. These two 
sentences summarise the intuition and policy relevance of this research, which is also 
motivated by three main factors in the scholarly and policy literature. These factors are: 
(i) the policy syndrome of inequality in the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); (ii) the issues of gender exclusion in the education and 
formal economic sectors and (iii) gaps in the literature. 
 First, income inequality is an important preoccupation for policy makers in the 
development of SSA is the post-2015 era for a multitude of policy and scholarly reasons. On 
the policy front, according to a recent report by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), SSA is unlikely to achieve most SDGs unless the concern of income inequality is 
addressed  (UNDP, 2017). The recommendation of the United Nations is supported by the 
attendant empirical literature (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; McGeown, 2017; Asongu & le 
Roux, 2019; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b) which is consistent on the importance of substantially 
curtailing inequality in order to put the sub-region on track to the achievement of SDGs. For 
instance, Bicaba, Brixiova and Ncube (2017) have established that countries in the sub-region 
are unlikely to reduce extreme poverty to the target of below 3% unless inequality is critically 
dealt with: “This paper examines its feasibility for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the world’s 
poorest but growing region. It finds that under plausible assumptions extreme poverty will not 
be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be reduced to low levels through high growth and 
income redistribution towards the poor segments of the society” (p. 93).  Among factors 
accounting for the policy syndrome of inequality in SSA is the issue of gender economic 
exclusion.  
                                                          
2The terms “gender economic participation”, “gender inclusion”, “female labour force participation”, “female 
economic participation”,“female employment” and “gender economic inclusion” are used interchangeably 
throughout the study. The terms “income inequality” and inequality are used interchangeably throughout this 
study.According to Asongu (2017) a policy syndrome is a gap in knowledge economy between countries. In this 
research, however, the conception of policy syndrome is consistent with a contemporary strand of inclusive 
development and pro-poor growth literature which associates exclusive development and inequality to policy 
syndromes (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Tchamyou, Erreygers &Cassimon, 2019; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b).   
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 Second, women in SSA are the poorest in the world, and gender economic exclusion is 
most apparent in the sub-region compared to other regions of the world (Hazel, 2010; Efobi, 
Tanakem & Asongu, 2018). Moreover, the concerns about gender exclusion are clearly 
articulated in the SDG agenda: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. “achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls”) and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”). The concerns 
pertaining to gender exclusion are further articulated in a recent World Bank report which has 
estimated the economic loss from the exclusion of women from the formal economic sector to 
represent about 2.5 trillion USD (World Bank, 2018; Nkurunziza, 2018). The conclusions of 
the report are broadly in accordance with the attendant scholarly and policy literature on the 
subject matter which, has established that in SSA, women are largely occupied with 
subsistence agriculture, petty trading and domestic chores (Ellis, Blackden, Cutura, 
MacCulloch & Seebens, 2007; FAO, 2011;Tandon & Wegerif, 2013;International Labour 
Organization, 2013; World Bank, 2015; Efobi et al., 2018). Moreover, the positioning of this 
research is also motivated by gaps in the corresponding literature. 
 Third, as discussed in Section 2, the extant inclusive development literature has not 
focused on the problem statement being tackled in this study. In the attendant section, the 
scholarly and policy relevance of the study is provided: these centre on the importance of 
inequality thresholds that should not be exceeded if gender inclusive education is to enhance 
gender inclusive formal economic participation in sub-Saharan Africa. In the light of 
contemporary development literature (Batuo, 2015; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020a, 2020b), the 
notion of a threshold is understood as a maximum level of income inequality thatpolicy 
makers should watch in order for gender inclusive education to promote gender economic 
participation. In other words, above the inequality threshold, a policy of gender inclusive 
education nolonger promotes gender economic participation.  
 The rest of the study proceeds as follows. The positioning of the study in the light of 
existing literature is discussed in Section 2. The data and methodology are covered in section 
2, while the empirical results and corresponding discussion are disclosed in section 3. Section 
4 concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Literature review and research objective  
This section articulates the positioning of the research in the light extant studies. To the best 
of our knowledge, the extant contemporary literature focusing on the concerns developed in 
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this introduction has failed to inform policy makers about thresholds of inequality that are 
detrimental for the favorable relevance of inclusive education in inclusive economic 
participation. Ntayi, Munene and Malinga (2018) have provided linkages between financial 
access and mobile money while emphasising on the modulating roles of social networks and 
gender. According to Uduji, Okolo-Obasi and Asongu (2019) and Uduji and Okolo-Obasi 
(2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d), it is important to implement corporate social responsibility 
policies and involve women in schemes that are designed to improve agricultural productivity 
in rural areas. The nexus between differences in gender and finance that is inclusive has been 
the focus of a study by Kairiza, Kiprono and Magadzire (2017) while Elu (2018) has 
presented a case for the involvement of women in science education. Bayraktar and Fofack 
(2018) are concerned with how gender is relevant within financial and informal sectors, 
whereas Mannah-Blankson (2018) investigates linkages between access to finance and the 
exclusion of gender in a microfinance setting.  A strand of the literature has also been 
interested in the participation of women in the agricultural sector in the light of SDGs 
(Theriault, Smale & Haider, 2017) while another strand has been motivated by the effect of 
information technology on gender inclusion either through direct (Efobi et al., 2018) or 
indirect mechanisms (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018).  
 Noticeably, in the engaged literature, Efobi et al. (2018) is the research that is closest 
to the positioning of this study. The authors have concluded that information technology has a 
positive incidence of female economic participation. This study is similar to Efobi et al. 
(2018) in that, it employs the three female economic participation indicators used in the 
underlying study as outcomes variables, namely: female labour force participation, female 
unemployment and female employment. Conversely, instead of employing information 
technology proxies as the independent variables of interest, in the light of the motivation of 
this study (which is summarised in the first paragraph and substantiated in subsequent 
paragraphs), the main independent variables of interest are inclusive education indicators and 
income inequality variables which respectively, represent policy variables and policy 
syndromes. Moreover, beyond departing from Efobi et al. (2018) in the perspective of 
differences in variables, the analytical scope of the study is tailored such that macroeconomic 
variables with positive (i.e. policy variables) and negative (i.e. policy syndromes) signals 
interact in order to affect the macroeconomic outcome variables used by Efobi et al. (2018). 
In so doing, this research takes on board concerns pertaining to SDGs that are missing in the 
motivation and policy implications of Efobi et al. (2018).  
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 In addition to the clarified difference between this research and the underlying study, 
we further argue that it is not enough to simply provide policy makers with signs and 
magnitude of effects between macroeconomic variables, as established by Efobi et al. (2018) 
and other studies in the strand of gender-centric extant inclusive development literature. This 
research goes beyond establishing such signs and magnitude of effects (i.e. between 
independent variables and outcome indicators) by establishing maximum limits of policy 
syndromes that should not be exceeded if policy variables are to have the targeted effect on 
policy outcomes. In other words, this research provides maximum thresholds of inequality 
that should not be exceeded in order for inclusive education policies to engender inclusive 
economic participation.  
 In the light of the motivational elements expanded above, it is apparent that this is an 
applied economics study that is motivated by: (i) intuition, (ii) policy concerns surrounding 
economic development in SSA in the post-2015 agenda and (iii) the need to complement 
extant literature. The authors of this study are also very knowledgeable of concerns that may 
be raised when an empirical analysis is not buttressed with solid and/or established theoretical 
underpinnings. The research argues that the premise for applied econometrics should not 
exclusively be motivated by the need to either validate or reject an established theoretical 
underpinning. Accordingly, in accordance with a recent strand of literature on the importance 
of applied econometrics (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a), this study argues that applied econometrics that is motivated 
by sound intuition and contemporary policy concerns is a useful scientific activity that can: (i) 
lead to theory-building, (ii) complement extant literature and (iii) provide policy makers with 
actionable policy recommendations. In essence, the intuition for this study is straight forward 
and simple to follow: income inequality affects how gender inclusive education promotes 
gender inclusive economic participation. Hence, it is policy-relevant to provide policy makers 
with critical masses of income inequality that mitigate the role of gender inclusive education 
in promoting gender economic inclusion. In so doing, this research complements Efobi et al. 
(2018) as critically engaged in the last-two paragraphs.   
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The focus of the research is on 42 nations in SSA with annual data for the period 2004 to 
20143. The choice of countries and temporal scopes are constrained by data availability 
concerns at the time of the study as well as the motivation underpinning the study covered in 
the introduction. The data come from four principal sources. (i)The three inequality indicators 
are from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP). These include the Gini 
coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. The last-two indicators are used to 
complement the first because the first does not capture tails or extreme points of the inequality 
distribution. These justifications are consistent with contemporary African inequality 
literature that is based on the three income inequality variables, notably: Meniago and Asongu 
(2018), Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b) and Tchamyou et al. (2019).   
(ii) Following Efobi et al. (2018) on which this research is partly positioned, the three gender 
participation indicators used as outcome variables are from the International Labor 
Organization. They include: female labour force participation, female unemployment and 
female employment.  
(iii) Three gender parity inclusive education indicators are obtained from World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank, namely: “primary and secondary education”, secondary 
education and tertiary education4. The motivation for engaging the three levels of education is 
from a contemporary strand of knowledge economy literature which argues for the need to 
engage all levels of education in order to articulate the relevance of lifelong learning and 
provide more room for policy implications (Tchamyou, 2017; Tchamyou, 2019a; Asongu & 
Tchamyou, 2016, 2019a, 2019b).  One control variable (i.e. remittances) is also obtained from 
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank while another control variable (i.e. 
political stability) is sourced from World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. In what 
follows, the study providesjustifications for: (i) the expected signs of the control variables, 
and (ii) limiting elements in the conditioning information set to two. 
                                                          
3The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
4
 “Primary and secondary education” and “inclusive primary and secondary education” are used interchangeably 
throughout the study. “Secondary education” and “inclusive secondary education” are used interchangeably 
throughout the study. “Tertiary education” and “inclusive tertiary school education” are used interchangeably 
throughout the study. 
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 On the front of limiting control variables to two, in the attendant Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM)-centric literature, it is tolerable to adopt limited control variables or no 
control variable in so far as the motivation for doing so is to have robust and efficient 
estimates. Accordingly, because the involvement of more variables in the conditioning 
information set increases instrument proliferation (even when the collapse option in the 
specification exercise is employed), in order to avoid the proliferation of instruments that 
subsequently bias and invalidate estimated models, studies in the GMM-centric literature have 
employed: (i) two control variables as in this research (Bruno, De Bonis &Silvestrini, 2012) 
and (ii) no control variable (Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b).  
 Concerning the expected signs from the control variables, it is important to first of all 
clarify that the control variables are consistent with contemporary inclusive development 
literature motivating this research (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Efobi et al., 2018; Asongu 
&Odhiambo, 2019a; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019).  In the light of the 
attendant literature, remittances have been documented to increase income inequality in 
Africa because majority of the population migrating abroad is from wealthier factions of 
African society (see Meniago & Asongu, 2018).  This narrative on the nexus between 
remittances and income inequality has been empirically extended to female economic 
participation by Asongu and Odhiambo (2018)5.  Conversely, political stability, ceteris 
paribus, is anticipated to engender favorable economic conditions for investment, job 
creation, employment and economic prosperity which are likely to benefit the female gender 
from the perspective of employment and/or participation in the labour force of the formal 
economic sector. Having clarified the expected signs from the conditioning information set, in 
the light of the outcome variables, political stability is anticipated to boost female labour force 
participation and female employment and by extension, reduce female unemployment. By 
analogy, the opposite effects are expected from remittances. The full definitions of the 
variables as well as their corresponding sources are disclosed in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 
provides the summary statistics, whereas Appendix 3 discloses the correlation matrix. 
 
 
                                                          
5Remittances have been documented to increase income inequality for the reasons outlined in the data section, 
notably: a greater proportion of those migrating abroad are from wealthier fractions of society. If income 
inequality is associated with gender inequality given the fact that women in SSA are poorest in the world (i.e. as 
clarified in the introduction), then remittances should intuitively be expected to increase gender economic 
inequality or reduce gender economic inclusion. 
9 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 GMM Specification 
Following the narrative on GMM-centric literature engaged in the preceding section, the 
GMM specification used for this research is also motivated by justifications for the choice of 
the estimation approach from the attendant literature. Hence, in the light of Tchamyou (2019a, 
2019b) and Tchamyou et al. (2019), four main justifications underpin the choice of the GMM 
technique as our empirical strategy. The first criterion requires that the number of yearly 
observations in each cross-section should not be higher than the corresponding number of 
cross-sections. This criterion is met because the research is based on 42 countries and annual 
observations for the period 2004-2014 (or 11 years). Second, the outcome variables exhibit 
features of persistence because the correlation coefficients pertaining to their level and first 
difference series’ are greater than 0.800 which is a rule of thumb for confirming the presence 
of persistence in an indicator (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b, 2019c). Third, in the light of the 
panel datastructure used for the empirical analysis, it follows that cross-country variations are 
not eliminated from the empirical exercise. Fourth, the challenging concern of endogeneity is 
addressed from two main perspectives: (i) the unobserved heterogeneity is taken on board by 
controlling for time-invariant omitted variables while (ii) reverse causality or simultaneity is 
accounted for by means of a process of instrumentation based on internal instruments. Among 
available GMM strategies, that employed in this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
technique based on forward orthogonal deviations because consistent with the engaged 
GMM-centric literature, it provides more robust estimates.  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard system 
GMM estimation procedure.  
tititititititititi RPEIIEGG ,,6,5,4,3,2,10,    
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(2)                                                                                                                          
 
where, tiG , representsan indicator of gender economic participation(i.e. female labour force 
participation, female unemployment and female employment) of  country i in  period t , 0 is 
a constant, E  entails inclusive education (“primary and secondary education”, secondary 
education and tertiary education), I denotes an income inequality indicator (i.e. the Gini 
coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio),  EI reflects interactions between 
education and inequality indicators (“primary and secondary education” × “the Gini 
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coefficient”;“secondary education” × “the Gini coefficient”; “tertiary education”×“the Gini 
coefficient”;“primary and secondary education” × “the Atkinson index”; “secondary 
education” × “the Atkinson index”; “tertiary education”×“the Atkinson index”; “primary and 
secondary education” × “the Palma ratio”; “secondary education” × “the Palma ratio”; 
“tertiary education”×“the Palma ratio”), P is political stability, R is remittances, is the 
coefficient of auto-regression which is one in this study because one year lag appropriately 
captures past information, t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-specific effect and 
ti ,  the error term.  
 
3.2.2Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
       In order to establish GMM estimates that are robust, a discourse on identification and 
exclusion restrictions is imperative. Identification within the context of the study is the 
processes of classifying variables as strictly exogenous and predetermining or endogenous 
explaining. Still following the GMM-centric literature, the years are considered as strictly 
exogenous variables whereas the independent variables of interest (i.e. inequality and 
education indicators) and elements in the conditioning information set (i.e. remittances and 
political stability) are considered as predetermined or endogenous explaining. This strategy 
which assumes that with the exception of years, all other indicators have both endogenous and 
exogenous components is in accordance with contemporary literature based on forward 
orthogonal deviations, notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c); Tchamyou and Asongu 
(2017);  Boateng et al.(2018) and Tchamyou et al.(2019). The identification and exclusion 
restrictions approach is consistent with the arguments of Roodman (2009b) because he has 
argued that years are appropriate as strictly exogenous variables because years are unlikely to 
be endogenous after a first difference6.   
         Given the underlying clarifications, in the results that are reported in the empirical 
results section, the criterion used to assess the validity of exclusion restrictions is the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. The null hypothesis of this test is 
the position that the identified strictly exogenous variables are valid instruments because they 
influence female economic participation exclusively via the exogenous components of the 
predetermined variables. Hence, this null hypothesis should not be rejected if the 
identification strategy and corresponding exclusion restrictions are to withstand empirical 
                                                          
6Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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scrutiny. This elucidation pertaining to the GMM approach with forward orthogonal 
deviations is not different from more traditional approaches in which, a rejection of the null 
hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan/Hansen test is an indication that the employed 
instruments explain the outcome variables beyond the identified exogenous components of the 
endogenous explaining variables (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2003; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016d; Amavilah, Asongu & Andrés, 2017). 
 
 
4. Empirical results  
Findings from the empirical analysis are disclosed in this section in Tables 1-3. Table 1 is 
concerned with inclusive education, inequality and female labour force participation, Table 2 
focuses on inclusive education, inequality and female unemployment, while Table 3 provides 
linkages between inclusive education, inequality and female employment. Each table is 
divided into three categories which are further divided into three sub-categories. The main 
focus of the categories is on respectively, “primary and secondary school education”, 
secondary education and tertiary school education while the sub-categories provide empirical 
insights into the three inequality indicators, namely: the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index 
and the Palma ratio.  
           For every estimated model, four main information criteria are employed to assess the 
validity of estimated models7.In the light of these criteria, results in the 2nd of 5th columns of 
Table 1 are not valid because the estimated models do not pass all post-estimation diagnostics 
tests. This is essential because in the corresponding two columns, after estimations,there is the 
presence of second-order serial correlation. Hence, thresholds are not computed for the two 
invalid models, though they are associated with significant conditional and unconditional 
estimated coefficients relevant for the computation of such thresholds.  
The approach to the computation of thresholds is consistent with recent threshold literature 
(Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019d). In line with the motivation of the study, the 
purpose of the threshold is to establish a critical mass at which, a rise in inequality is 
                                                          
7
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu& De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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detrimental to the positive nexus between inclusive gender education and inclusive gender 
economic participation. Hence, the research expects the unconditional effects of inclusive 
education to be positive on female economic participation, whereas the unconditional effects 
from the interaction between inequality and inclusive education to be negative. Hence, given 
the negative conditional or interactive effects, inflexion points at which the positive 
unconditional effect can be totally dampened for a zero effect on female economic 
participation can be established.  
           Consistent with the expectations of the study, in Table 1 and Table 3, the unconditional 
effects on female labour force participation and female employment are positive, whereas the 
corresponding conditional effects are negative. Conversely, in Table 2, the unconditional 
effects on female unemployment are negative, whereas the corresponding conditional effects 
are positive. These tendencies are consistent with the intuition for the study because the 
outcome variables in Table 1 and Table 3 are favourable to gender economic participation, 
whereas the outcome variable in Table 2 is a negative signal and hence unfavourable to 
gender economic participation. 
             As an exampleof threshold computation, in the 8th column of Table 1, 0.562 
(5.250/9.331) is the threshold of the Gini coefficient from which inclusive tertiary education 
no longer induces a positive effect on female labour force participation. In the calculation, 
5.250 is the unconditional effect of inclusive tertiary education on female labour participation 
while 9.331 is the absolute value of the corresponding conditional effect from the interaction 
between inclusive tertiary education and the Gini coefficient. It follows that above a Gini 
coefficient of 0.562, the Gini coefficient completely dampens the positive impact of inclusive 
tertiary education on the attendant outcome variable.  
             The following findings can be established from Tables 1-3. First, inclusive tertiary 
education unconditionally promotes gender economic inclusion while the interaction between 
tertiary education and inequality is unfavourable to gender economic inclusion. Second, a 
Gini coefficient that nullifies the positive incidence of tertiary education on female labour 
force participation is 0.562. Second, the Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio that crowd-out 
the negative unconditional effects of tertiary school education on female unemployment are 
0.547 and 6.118, respectively. Third, a 0.578 Gini coefficient, a 0.680 Atkinson index and a 
6.557 Palma ratio are critical masses that wipe-out the positive unconditional effect of tertiary 
education on female employment. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected 
signs.  
13 
 
Table 1: Inclusive Education, Inequality and Female Labour Force Participation  
          
 Dependent variable: Female Labour Force Participation (FLFPart) 
          
 Primary and Secondary School 
Enrolment (PSSE) 
Secondary School Enrolment (SSE) Tertiary School Enrolment (TSE) 
          
 Gini Atkison  Palma Gini Atkison  Palma Gini Atkison  Palma 
          
FLFPart (-1) 0.983*** 0.986*** 0.983*** 0.976*** 0.978*** 0.979*** 0.971*** 0.967*** 0.966*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) 17.522 --- --- 16.450 --- --- 15.064* --- --- 
 
(0.250)   (0.133)   (0.051)   
Atkinson Index (Atkinson) --- -6.900 --- --- -12.725* --- --- 2.233 --- 
 
 (0.421)   (0.076)   (0.390)  
Palma Ratio (Palma) --- --- -0.316 --- --- -0.499 --- --- 0.019 
 
  (0.399)   (0.161)   (0.830) 
PSSE 13.399* -5.145 0.201 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.084) (0.435) (0.918)       
SSE --- --- --- 12.180** -9.401 -3.440 --- --- --- 
 
   (0.046) (0.115) (0.182)    
TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- 5.250* 3.012 1.085 
 
      (0.088) (0.209) (0.146) 
Gini × PSE -26.054* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.077)         
Gini × SSE --- --- --- -23.102** --- --- --- --- --- 
 
   (0.025)      
Gini × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- -9.331* --- --- 
 
      (0.083)   
Atkinson × PSE --- 3.688 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.690)        
Atkinson × SSE --- --- --- --- 10.590 --- --- --- --- 
 
    (0.181)     
Atkinson × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.493 --- 
 
       (0.138)  
Palma × PSE --- --- 0.019 --- --- 0.317 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.958)   (0.387)    
Palma × SSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
         
Palma × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.177** 
 
        (0.042) 
Political Stability  0.578*** 0.549*** 0.614*** 0.753*** 0.757*** 0.808*** 0.332*** 0.172* 0.228** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.089) (0.014) 
Remittances  -0.040*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.015* -0.007 -0.010 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.068) (0.508) (0.274) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Thresholds nsa na na nsa na na 0.562 na na 
          
AR(1) (0.072) (0.067) (0.078) (0.076) (0.036) (0.058) (0.082) (0.087) (0.076) 
AR(2) (0.064) (0.180) (0.100) (0.086) (0.144) (0.119) (0.310) (0.293) (0.268) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.018) (0.036) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) 
Hansen OIR (0.454) (0.617) (0.632) (0.507) (0.711) (0.547) (0.210) (0.415) (0.336) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.362) (0.228) (0.259) (0.265) (0.317) (0.635) (0.279) (0.050) (0.063) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.465) (0.754) (0.744) (0.596) (0.786) (0.441) (0.228) (0.825) (0.684 ) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.283) (0.509) (0.250) (0.467) (0.607) (0.351) (0.258) (0.312) (0.665) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.564) (0.578) (0.830) (0.470) (0.629) (0.619) (0.249) (0.481) (0.191) 
          
Fisher  16276*** 1.41e+07 
*** 
720301*** 10725*** 54942*** 12829*** 22892*** 394503*** 38122*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  36 36 36 35 35 35 34 34 34 
Observations  254 254 254 236 236 236 192 192 192 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Constants are included in all regressions. nsa: not specifically applicable because the 
model is not valid. na: not applicable because at least estimate needed for the computation of thresholds is not significant.  
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Table 2: Inclusive Education, Inequality and Female Unemployment 
          
 Dependent variable: Female Unemployment  (FU) 
          
 Primary and Secondary School 
Enrolment (PSSE) 
Secondary School Enrolment (SSE) Tertiary School Enrolment (TSE) 
          
 Gini Atkison  Palma Gini Atkison  Palma Gini Atkison  Palma 
          
FU(-1) 0.970*** 0.971*** 0.970*** 0.956***   0.937*** 0.944*** 0.880*** 0.981*** 0.822*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) 15.445 --- --- 5.989 --- --- -34.651** --- --- 
 
(0.285)   (0.676)   (0.021)   
Atkinson Index (Atkinson) --- 13.507 --- --- -2.637 --- --- 9.228 --- 
 
 (0.197)   (0.669)   (0.666)  
Palma Ratio (Palma) --- --- 0.443 --- --- -0.211 --- --- -1.086 
 
  (0.143)   (0.295)   (0.118) 
PSSE 8.247 7.442 2.217 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.271) (0.365) (0.159)       
SSE --- --- --- 3.176 -1.346 0.156 --- --- --- 
 
   (0.687) (0.792) (0.932)    
TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- -45.817*** -12.842 -17.456** 
 
      (0.000) (0.559) (0.027) 
Gini × PSE -14.074 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.287)         
Gini × SSE --- --- --- -4.388 --- --- --- --- --- 
 
   (0.753)      
Gini × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- 83.662*** --- --- 
 
      (0.000)   
Atkinson × PSE --- -11.035 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.333)        
Atkinson × SSE --- --- --- --- 3.668 --- --- --- --- 
 
    (0.568)     
Atkinson × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 21.264 --- 
 
       (0.501)  
Palma × PSE --- --- -0.410 --- --- 0.200 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.138)   (0.307)    
Palma × SSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
         
Palma × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.853*** 
 
        (0.009) 
Political Stability  0.133 -0.037 0.121 0.233 0.145 0.206 -0.472** -0.581 -0.921*** 
 
(0.101) (0.531) (0.104) (0.125) (0.187) (0.156) (0.019) (0.176) (0.008) 
Remittances  -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.004 -0.032 0.180*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.844) (0.685) (0.001) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Thresholds na na na na na na 0.547 na 6.118 
          
AR(1) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.021) (0.070) (0.034) 
AR(2) (0.776) (0.821) (0.801) (0.840) (0.833) (0.814) (0.441) (0.375) (0.313) 
Sargan OIR (0.331) (0.346) (0.421) (0.284) (0.409) (0.553) (0.000) (0.030) (0.007) 
Hansen OIR (0.204) (0.368) (0.285) (0.474) (0.408) (0.381) (0.372) (0.834) (0.347) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.077) (0.297) (0.169) (0.151) (0.348) (0.256) (0.513) (0.711) (0.806) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.426) (0.406) (0.407) (0.679) (0.420) (0.450) (0.307) (0.751) (0.207) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.134) (0.039) (0.083) (0.187) (0.155) (0.175) (0.492) (0.753) (0.429) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.382) (0.945) (0.664) (0.721) (0.684) (0.608) (0.298) (0.710) (0.306) 
          
Fisher  495748*** 72193*** 609618*** 5.20e+06 
*** 
32363*** 4.43e+06 
*** 
16781.82 
*** 
32372.63 
*** 
4054.54 
*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  34 34 34 33 33 33 32 32 32 
Observations  237 237 237 219 219 219 181 181 181 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Constants are included in all regressions.na: not applicable because at least estimate 
needed for the computation of thresholds is not significant.  
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Table 3: Inclusive Education, Inequality and Female Employment 
          
 Dependent variable: Female Employment  (FE) 
          
 Primary and Secondary School 
Enrolment (PSSE) 
Secondary School Enrolment (SSE) Tertiary School Enrolment (TSE) 
          
 Gini Atkison  Palma Gini Atkison  Palma Gini Atkison  Palma 
          
FE(-1) 0.990*** 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.990*** 0.984*** 0.987*** 0.957*** 0.964***   0.943*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) 0.434 --- --- -0.195 --- --- 41.081*** --- --- 
 
(0.969)   (0.985)   (0.000)   
Atkinson Index (Atkinson) --- -1.066 --- --- -7.197 --- --- 2.552 --- 
 
 (0.883)   (0.117)   (0.663)  
Palma Ratio (Palma) --- --- -0.401 --- --- -0.207 --- --- 1.205*** 
 
  (0.177)   (0.251)   (0.007) 
PSSE 2.500 1.622 0.233 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.647) (0.758) (0.817)       
SSE --- --- --- 3.248 -5.996 -0.685 --- --- --- 
 
   (0.574) (0.105) (0.523)    
TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- 34.896*** 11.651*** 9.233*** 
 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Gini × PSE -5.243 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.602)         
Gini × SSE --- --- --- -5.724 --- --- --- --- --- 
 
   (0.590)      
Gini × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- -60.364*** --- --- 
 
      (0.000)   
Atkinson × PSE --- -1.891 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.795)        
Atkinson × SSE --- --- --- --- 7.181 --- --- --- --- 
 
    (0.131)     
Atkinson × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -17.116*** --- 
 
       (0.000)  
Palma × PSE --- --- --- --- --- 0.060 --- --- --- 
 
     (0.702)    
Palma × SSE --- --- 0.204 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
  (0.396)       
Palma × TSE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.408*** 
 
        (0.001) 
Political Stability  0.246*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.275** 0.221* 0.268** 0.225 -0.070 0.289 
 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.034) (0.087) (0.024) (0.250) (0.737) (0.163) 
Remittances  0.0001 0.007* -0.001 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.017* -0.032*** -0.061*** 
 
(0.966) (0.062) (0.642) (0.162) (0.533) (0.197) (0.079) (0.004) (0.000) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Thresholds na na na na na na 0.578 0.680 6.557 
          
AR(1) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.032) (0.040) (0.031) 
AR(2) (0.421) (0.482) (0.494) (0.975) (0.982) (0.976) (0.269) (0.196) (0.253) 
Sargan OIR (0.416) (0.620) (0.674) (0.281) (0.586) (0.568) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.151) (0.277) (0.334) (0.330) (0.377) (0.377) (0.837) (0.511) (0.709) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.024) (0.358) (0.374) (0.174) (0.531) (0.575) (0.302) (0.338) (0.321) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.539) (0.269) (0.324) (0.463) (0.305) (0.292) (0.918) (0.547) (0.781) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.399) (0.340) (0.289) (0.259) (0.486) (0.513) (0.514) (0.429) (0.141) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.115) (0.280) (0.394) (0.418) (0.306) (0.293) (0.848) (0.505) (0.983) 
          
Fisher  450801*** 268082*** 3.15e+06 
*** 
99742.60 
*** 
1.29e+07 
*** 
226728.65 
*** 
5.28e+06 
*** 
182224*** 2145.95*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  34 34 34 33 33 33 32 32 32 
Observations  237 237 237 219 219 219 181 181 181 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Constants are included in all regressions.na: not applicable because at least estimate 
needed for the computation of thresholds is not significant.  
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5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
This study provides thresholds of inequality that should not be exceeded if gender inclusive 
education is to enhance gender inclusive formal economic participation in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and data from 42 
countries during the period 2004-2014. Income inequality is measured with the Gini 
coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio while inclusive gender economic 
participation is measured with female labour force participation, female employment and 
female unemployment. Three gender parity indicators are also used for the analysis, namely: 
“primary and secondary education”, secondary education and tertiary education.  
The following findings are established.  First, inclusive tertiary education 
unconditionally promotes gender economic inclusion while the interaction between tertiary 
education and inequality is unfavourable to gender economic inclusion. Second, a Gini 
coefficient that nullifies the positive incidence of inclusive tertiary education on female labour 
force participation is 0.562. Second, the Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio that crowd-out 
the negative unconditional effects of inclusive tertiary education on female unemployment are 
respectively, 0.547 and 6.118. Third, a 0.578 Gini coefficient, a 0.680 Atkinson index and a 
6.557 Palma ratio are critical masses that wipe-out the positive unconditional effects of 
inclusive tertiary education on female employment. Findings associated with lower levels of 
education are not significant. As the main policy implication, income inequality should not be 
tolerated above the established thresholds in order for gender inclusive education to promote 
gender inclusive formal economic participation.   
It is worthwhile for policy makers to restrict inequality levels, not exclusively because 
doing so will boost inclusive economic participation but also because the engagement of more 
women in the formal economic sector also improves the negative responsiveness of extreme 
poverty to economic prosperity. Accordingly, more engagement of women also concurrently 
reduce income inequality and hence, a more favourable extreme poverty reduction from 
economic growth. It is important to recall that the response of poverty to economic growth is 
a negative function of inequality and that providing more women with job opportunities is a 
means of reducing income inequality because as articulated in the introduction, women in 
SSA are the poorest and most excluded from formal economic activities in the world. 
Moreover, empowering women with job opportunities has a plethora of positive development 
externalities outlined in the introduction.  
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Accordingly, no country can be developed sustainably if the majority of its population 
is excluded from partaking in the process of wealth creation. As such, reducing income 
inequality will not only engender more reduction of extreme poverty (owing to the reduction 
of income inequality pertaining to gender exclusion) but will also increase the overall wealth 
created by sampled nations because as outlined in the motivation of the study, a World Bank 
report has established that a significant loss in the wealth of countries in SSA is the result of 
women being excluded from formal economic activities.  
Ultimately, checking income inequality levels will help sampled countries in the target 
of reducing extreme poverty to a below 3% threshold by 2030 in the light of the SDG extreme 
poverty target. Moreover, the positioning of the study and corresponding findings also 
directly speak to two specific SDGs: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. “achieve gender equality and empower 
all women and girls”) and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”). In a nutshell, 
policies that are tailored to mitigate income inequality and concurrently promote inclusive 
education will lead to positive economic ramifications associated with female employment 
that engenders potential externalities in inter alia: improvements in the structural distribution 
of labour, poverty reduction and boosts in household and societal welfare.  
The findings have also shown that the level of inequality affects the effectiveness of 
inclusive education policies on inclusive economic participation and the significance of such 
inequality is more apparent in the relevance of tertiary education in promoting economic 
inclusion, compared to other levels of education.  An implication of the comparative 
relevance of tertiary education is that females should be encouraged to school upto higher 
levels of education in order to improve their chances of participating in economic prosperity 
through the formal economic sector. This comparative finding is also a caution to scholarship 
or research that justifies the use primary school enrolment instead of higher levels of 
education with the fact that compared to higher levels of education, primary education has 
been documented to be more instrumental in promoting socio-economic participation and 
economic development when countries are at initial stages of industrialisation (Petrakis& 
Stamatakis, 2002; Asiedu, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018). Accordingly, going by the 
findings in this study, ceteris paribus, the justifications for exclusively using primary school 
education as indicators of human capital do not withstand empirical scrutiny. Such failure to 
withstand empirical scrutiny may be traceable to the fact that sampled African countries are 
averagely not at their initial stages of industrialisation.  
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The extant literature can be improved if future studies could use relevant country-
specific empirical techniques to assess whether the established findings in this study 
withstand empirical scrutiny from country-specific frameworks. This recommendation builds 
on the caveat that country-specific effects are eliminated in GMM modelling in order to avoid 
endogeneity resulting from the correlation between the lagged outcome variable and country-
specific effects.  
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Female Economic 
Participation   
FLFpart Labor force participation rate, female (% of female 
population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
   
FU Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
 
 
 
FE Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
    
Primary  and 
Secondary  School 
PSSE School enrolment, primary and secondary (gross), 
gender parity index (GPI) 
WDI 
    
Secondary  School  SSE School enrolment, secondary (gross), gender parity 
index (GPI) 
WDI 
    
Tertiary  School TSE School enrolment, tertiary (gross), gender parity index 
(GPI) 
WDI 
    
Gini Index Gini  “The Gini index is a measurement of the income 
distribution of a country's residents”. 
GCIP 
    
Atkinson Index Atkinson  “The Atkinson index measures inequality 
bydetermining which end of the distribution 
contributed most to the observed inequality”. 
GCIP 
    
Palma Ratio Palma  “The Palma ratio is defined as the ratio of the richest 
10% of the population's share of gross national income 
divided by the poorest 40%'s share”. 
GCIP 
  
 
 
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
WGI 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Female Labor Force participation  62.515 15.685 30.00 88.80 451 
Female Unemployment, female 10.831 8.736 0.300 44.800 429 
Female Employment  57.201 15.828 23.700 86.400 429 
Primary & Secondary  School 
Enrolment  
0.919 0.111 0.600 1.105 307 
Secondary School Enrolment  0.867 0.214 0.333 1.422 287 
Tertiary School Enrolment 0.731 0.433 0.064 3.295 232 
Gini  Coefficient  0.586 0.034 0.488 0.851 461 
Atkinson Index  0.705 0.058 0.509 0.834 461 
Palma Ratio  6.457 1.477 3.015 14.434 461 
Political Stability  -0.471 0.905 -2.687 1.182 462 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 156) 
            
FLFpart FU FE PSSE SSE TSE Gini Atkinson Palma PolS Remit  
1.000 -0.267 0.948 0.106 -0.180 -0.414 0.093 0.036 0.074 0.012 -0.141 FLFpart 
 1.000 -0.548 0.276 0.511 0.562 0.340 0.560 0.470 0.169 0.397 FU 
  1.000 0.032 -0.295 -0.510 -0.025 -0.146 -0.084 -0.066 -0.247 FE 
   1.000 0.866 0.701 0.392 0.374 0.421 0.538 0.327 PSSE 
    1.000 0.873 0.425 0.519 0.519 0.538 0.507 SSE 
     1.000 0.315 0.430 0.384 0.393 0.407 TSE 
      1.000 0.844 0.922 0.373 0.130 Gini 
       1.000 0.944 0.319 0.379 Atkinson 
        1.000 0.394 0.288 Palma 
         1.000 0.169 PolS 
          1.000 Remit 
            
FLFpart: Female Labour Force participation. FU: Female Unemployment. FE: Female Employment. PSSE: Primary &Secondary School 
Enrollment.  SSE: Secondary School Enrollment.   TSE: Tertiary School Enrollment.  Gini: the Gini coefficient. Atkinson: the Atkinson 
index. Palma: the Palma ratio. PolS: Political Stability. Remit: Remittances.  
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